The Islamic intellectual tradition has never been monolithic in its approach to speculative inquiry. Despite a well-documented flourishing of rational and philosophical discourse in classical Islamic civilization, there existed an offsetting current, one older and in many respects more authoritative, that subjected speculative questioning to scrutiny and, in certain domains, to outright prohibition. This regulatory framework can not adequately be described as anti-intellectualism, nor as a simple tension between reason and revelation. It should instead be understood as the expression of a coherent ethical framework that governed the conditions under which inquiry is permissible, the purposes it must serve, and the boundaries it may not cross.

The early Muslim community inherited from the Qurʾān and the prophetic practice a set of orienting dispositions toward knowledge. It was that though knowledge is the most meritorious human asset and that its pursuit is an act of worship, not all questions are equally worth asking. Some lines of inquiry are harmful to the one who pursues them or to the community that entertains them. The short exposition below describes certain aspects of this ethical framework using material drawn from several areas of the Islamic intellectual tradition which sought to define the proper conduct of scholarly inquiry and disputation.

It should first be born in mind that much of the evidence found in the Islamic intellectual tradition that points to a limitation on speculative inquiry by early Muslims relates to legal contexts, despite law being a field grounded in practical application. One of the earliest instances of opposition to hypothetical enquiry can be traced back to the era of the Prophet’s Companions, may Allah be pleased with them. For instance, when the Companion ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿUmar, may Allah be pleased with him, was once consulted about a hypothetical situation, he responded: “Do not inquire about that which has not [yet] happened. I heard ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb condemn (yalʿanu) those who inquire about that which has not [yet] happened.”^[1]

Similarly, the scholar-Companion, Zayd b. Thābit,, may Allah be pleased with him, when posed with hypothetical questions, would first ask: “Has this occurred?” If the response was yes, he would offer advice based on his knowledge and judgment. If the response was in the negative, he advised “Let it be until it happens.”^[2] Companions like ʿAmmār b. Yāsir^[3] and Ubayy b. Kaʿb^[4], may Allah be pleased with them both, expressed similar sentiments upon being questioned.^[5]

Al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī interprets the statements of these Companions as precautions about offering personal judgments due to the fear of making mistakes and out of respect for the potential dangers in making independent legal decisions (ijtihād). They opted for a cautious approach in situations that had not yet occurred, especially in unforeseen events. Their view was that should such situations arise, the need for their guidance would become apparent, and in those moments, Allah would assist those seeking to discern the truth. In the specific case of the Caliph ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb, may Allah be pleased with him, other historical reports articulate his rationale for limiting speculative questioning: he simply prioritized the study of past events, emphasizing that Allah has already outlined what is to come.^[6]  

Al-Khaṭīb views the caution expressed by these Companions in rendering personal judgments as stemming from an awareness of the risks associated with independent legal reasoning (ijtihād) and a desire to avoid errors. They favored a reserved approach when dealing with hypothetical or unforeseen situations, believing that, should such circumstances manifest, the necessity for their insights would emerge, with divine guidance aiding those in pursuit of truth. Specifically regarding the Caliph ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb, may Allah be pleased with him, additional accounts highlight his approach to speculative inquiries: he placed a greater emphasis on learning from historical precedents, underlining the belief that divine revelation has preemptively addressed future events.

This context is crucial for understanding why, despite these reservations, a substantial body of early Islamic scholarship meticulously documented legal judgments covering a broad spectrum of real and speculative issues. This was done, according to some scholars, in order to guarantee that subsequent generations could easily access solutions to unforeseen future issues. These scholars perceived the cautious warnings of certain Companions and their Followers as grounded in a combination of foresight and devoutness, and not as a blanket ban on speculative thought. Al-Bayhaqī, for instance, cites the 4th-century Shāfiʿī jurist, theologian, and traditionist Abū ʿAbd Allāh al-Ḥalīmī (d. 403) as allowing students of law to explore hypothetical legal scenarios as a means to hone their skills in legal reasoning and independent judgment (ijtihād).^[7]

Al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, having relayed statements of restraint from several Companions and Followers, clarifies that the Prophet’s aversion to certain types of queries stemmed from a desire to protect his community. This protective measure was born from concern that excessive speculation about a matter might inadvertently lead to its prohibition, despite its default lawful status. Essentially, the act of questioning could paradoxically result in forbidding something inherently permissible. This worry, according to al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, ceased to be relevant following the Prophet’s passing, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, as such inquiries no longer have the power to affect the legal status of actions or practices.^[8]

To illustrate the broad acceptance of speculative inquiry in the Islamic intellectual tradition, al-Khaṭīb, references an occasion in which the Companion Rāfiʿ b. Khadīj, may Allah be pleased with him, questioned the Prophet (may Allah bless him and grant him peace), saying: “Messenger of Allah! We anticipate confronting the enemy tomorrow, and we lack knives (implying that using their swords to slaughter animals might blunt them). May we slaughter using (sharpened) reeds instead?” The Messenger of Allah (may Allah bless him and grant him peace) answered: “Anything that makes blood flow, and which is not teeth or nails, and upon which Allah’s name is invoked, then eat (it)”.^[9] Given that Rāfiʿ b. Khadīj’s inquiry concerned a future event, and the Prophet (may Allah bless him and grant him peace) provided guidance without expressing any disapproval of the question, this incident highlights the acceptance of speculative questioning about future situations.

A clearer demonstration that speculative inquiry is generally acceptable within an Islamic ethical framework is found in an incident in which Salama b. Yazīd al-Juʿfī, may Allah be pleased with him, asked the Prophet (may Allah bless him and grant him peace): “Messenger of Allah! What do you think if we have rulers over us who demand their rights from us but deny us our rights? Should we engage with them in combat?” Ashʿath b. Qays stood up and objected: “You ask the Messenger of Allah (may Allah bless him and grant him peace) about an issue that has not yet happened?!” The man retorted: “I will surely ask him until he forbids me” and proceeded to repeat the question. The Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, responded, saying: “No. They are responsible for what they have been charged with, and you are responsible for what you have been charged with.”^[10] Al-Khaṭīb explains: “The Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, did not forbid the man from asking this question, nor rebuke him for it. Instead, he replied without objection. Similar incidents in support of the aforementioned (idea of permissible speculative questioning) can be found in many historical reports.”^[11] Al-Khaṭīb then proceeds to state that it is reported that ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb, ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib, as well as other Companions would discuss the rules of scenarios before they had occurred and debated amongst themselves on issues of inheritance law. The scholars amongst the Followers and then those after them throughout the Muslim world similarly engaged in discussions and debates on non-occurrences, indicating a type of consensus (ijmāʿ) on the allowance for some degree of speculative inquiry.

One clear example of such type of inquiry in the era of the Followers is a conversation that took place between the Qurʾānic scholar and traditionists Qatāda and the eponymous founder of the Ḥanafī school, Abū Ḥanīfa (d. 150) when the former came to Kufa and invited the residents to ask him legal questions. Abū Ḥanīfa stood up and asked: “What do you say about a man who is absent from his wife (for a long time), and then her husband’s death is announced (incorrectly). Subsequently, his wife marries another man and gives birth to children. But then her husband returns, and he says (to her): Adulteress! You married (another), while I am (still) your husband?!” At the same time, the other says to her: “Adulteress! You married (me) while you had a husband?!” Is the nondiscretionary punishment (ḥadd) necessary, and to whom are the children attributed?” Qatāda remained in thought for a while and asked, “Has this situation actually occurred?” The people replied, “No.” Qatāda exclaimed, “Then why do you ask me about what has not occurred?” Abū Ḥanīfa responded: “Scholars prepare for calamities before they strike, so if they do occur, they recognize them well. They know how to enter into such situations and how to exit from them.”^[12]

Al-Khaṭīb’s explanation of ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb’s approach to non-occurrences helps us understand some of the epistemological parameters of scientific inquiry in the Islamic tradition. According to al-Khaṭīb, ʿUmar’s condemnation of speculative inquiries was likely aimed at questions posed out of stubbornness and deceit, rather than a genuine desire for understanding or seeking beneficial knowledge. This explains his actions against Ṣabīgh b. ʿAsal, whom he punished, exiled, and cut off financially for asking about complex verses of the Qurʾān. Umar was likely concerned that Ṣabīgh’s questions were intended to undermine the faith of the less knowledgeable Muslims by introducing doubts and leading them astray with incorrect interpretations of the Qurʾān, away from its intended message and towards flawed understandings. Such acts were also forbidden and disapproved of by the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, who condemned those who engaged in such trick questions, or ughlūṭāt (pl. ughlūṭa, meaning questions that are intended to baffle the scholars and cause them to err, giving rise to communal trouble and ruin).^[13] This is because such types of questions possess no religious utility (ghayr nāfiʿa fī al-dīn) and are usually posed in the realm of non-occurrences. This is likely the meaning of the Companion ʿAbd Allāh b. Masʿūd’s statement: “I warn you about complex discussions”, which al-Awzāʿī explained as “complex questions”.^[14]

^[1] al-Dārimī, Sunan al-Dārimī, al-ʿIlm, bāb karāhiyyat al-futyā, no. 128, 1:26. Sunan al-Dārimī‘s commentator, Nabīl b. Muḥammad al-Ghamarī, in his Fatḥ al-Mannān (2:81), states that the chain for the report is acceptable (maqbūl).

^[2] Ibid. This report is transmitted through a disconnected chain between the narrator al-Zuhrī and Zayd b. Thābit. See al-Ghamarī, Fatḥ al-Mannān, 2:82.

^[3] al-Būṣīrī states in Itḥāf al-Khiyara al-Mahara (Riyadh: Maktabat al-Rushd), 1:301, no. 525, that the report is sound if al-Shaʿbī indeed heard reports directly from ʿAmmār, and its narrators are all reliable.

^[4] al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, al-Faqīh wa-l-Mutafaqqih, 2:14, no. 262. Al-Khaṭīb transmits the report through Abū Khaythama but doesn’t mention his chain to him, making the report disconnected (munqaṭiʿ) and suspended (muʿallaq) from its beginning end.

^[5] Ibn al-Munayyir reports a similar habit of the mujtahid imam Mālik b. Anas, who would state that the one who responds to real questions is divinely assisted, otherwise they are met with disappointment. See al-Ḥajawī, al-Fikr al-Sāmī, 2:420.

^[6] al-Dārimī, Sunan, muqaddima, bāb karāhiyyat al-futyā, 1:242-244, no. 123-126; al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, al-Faqīh wa-l-Mutafaqqih, 2:12, no. 260.  ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ Abū Ghudda notes that the chain of these reports are disconnected even if the narrators are all trustworthy in his Manhaj al-Salaf fī al-Suʾāl ʿan al-ʿIlm, pg. 16. Muḥammad Taqī al-ʿUthmānī mentions that the prohibition of hypothetical inquiry may be evidenced by a mursal (disconnected chained) report through Abū Salama b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān, that the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said: “Do not hasten affliction before it descends, for if you do not hasten it before its arrival, the Muslims will remain united. But when it does descend, among them are those who, if they speak, are guided and accurate. If you hasten it, inclinations will vary among you, leading you to take this or that path,” and he gestured in front of him and to his right and his left.” This report is transmitted by al-Dārimī in his Sunan, bāb al-tawarruʿ ʿan al-jawāb fīmā laysa fīhī kitāb wa lā sunna, 1:238-239, no. 118.

^[7] al-Bayhaqī, al-Madkhal, bāb man kariha al-masʿala ʿammā lam yakun, 1:226. 

^[8] al-Khaṭīb, al-Faqīh wa-l-Mutafaqqih, 2:30-31.

^[9] al-Bukhārī, Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, al-Zabāʾiḥ wa-l-Ṣayd, bāb al-tasmiya ʿalā al-dhabīḥa wa-man taraka mutaʿammidan, no. 5498.

^[10] Muslim, Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, al-Imārah, bāb fī ṭāʿat al-umarāʾ, no. 4745-4746; al-Tirmidhī, Sunan al-Tirmidhī, al-Fitan, bāb mā jāʾa satakūnu fitan ka-qiṭaʿ al-layl al-muẓlim, no. 2199. al-Tirmidhī grades the report as ḥasan ṣaḥīḥ. 

^[11] al-Khaṭīb, al-Faqīh wa-l-Mutafaqqih, 2:30-31.

^[12] This is portion of the full incident, which can be found in full in al-Ṣaymarī, Akhbār Abī Ḥanīfa wa Aṣḥābihi, 35-36; Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr, al-Intiqāʾ, 304-305; al-Khaṭīb, Tārīkh Madīnat al-Salām, 13:348-349; al-Muwaffaq, al-Manāqib, 1:102-103; al-Kardarī, al-Manāqib, 1:158.  

^[13] Ibn Athīr, al-Nihāya, pg. 663. About such types of trick questions, the Messenger of Allah (may Allah bless him and grant him peace) said: “There will be people from my nation who will (try to) cause their men of understanding to fall into error with perplexing (ʿaḍl) questions. They are the worst of my nation.” See al-Khaṭīb, al-Faqīh wa-l-Mutafaqqih, 2:30-31.

^[14] Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr, Jāmiʿ Bayān al-ʿIlm wa Faḍlihi, bāb mā jāʾa fī dhamm al-qawl fī dīn Allāh taʿālā, 2:421, no. 1140.